 发一个《1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用》，也是以前在本版收藏的。
INFANTRY OPERATIONS AND WEAPONS USAGE IN KOREA
[ 转自铁血社区 http://bbs.tiexue.net/ ] Winter of 1950-1951
OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
The Johns Hopkins University
Chevy Chase, Maryland
作者：S. L. A. Marshall准将
进攻中的中共军队
[ 转自铁血社区 http://bbs.tiexue.net/ ] 当描述敌人在这个国家开展的军事行动时，人们滥用了“人海战术”一词。新闻报道曾给人一种印象：中国人以极度密集的大量兵力发动进攻。某些官方文件也曾过于随意地用过这个词，因此就加深了人们的这样一种误解，即在我军各种武器火力笼罩下的敌军目标，正如“人海战术”一词所形容的那样，是个密集而又宽大从而有利于我方火力大量杀伤敌军的那样一种目标。曾有过这种性质的目标。例如，二月初中共军队进攻第23步兵团在砥平里的阵地时，以密集队形向前推进，在狭小区域内被大批地扫倒。
但这样的高兵力密度是例外。二战中红军在乌克兰战役对付德国人时，连续使用过以人海吸收并最终中和敌军火力，中国人集中兵力时并不是这样。更确切的说，中国人在接敌的最后阶段从纵队展开后，往往以多层细散兵线接近我们的工事，彼此间有相当的间隔。接敌纵队可能为一列宽，甚至为以4列纵队接敌的团级兵力，这取决于形势和攻击部队的规模。
地面状况的复杂情况也增加了我军火力集中捕捉敌军目标的困难，因为在各种复杂的地面状况下，敌军的进攻队形被自然的分散了，这就加大了我军火力集中一处而大量杀伤敌军的难度。山岭从来不是平直的，经常有突出部、裸岩、洼地、细沟。结果，即使攻击队列行进速度一致，也没有哪种防御武器有杀伤任何大量敌人的清晰的射程。当敌人进入各种武器的反击火力射程之内，渐渐向阵地推近时，依然不会过分簇集。
在防御时，中共军队有效利用了地被植物，避免使用长的壕沟和密集队形，经常通过自身部署使我们的各种火力极少有大规模杀死他们的机会。主要战果是通过系统地使用合成火力取得的，没有哪一种或哪一类武器（迫击炮、大炮或轻武器）在实施决定性射击的过程中起主导作用。
CCF IN ATTACK
The word “mass” has been used quite loosely in descriptions of enemy operations circulated in this country. Press accounts have given the impression that the Chinese attack in great numbers closely concentrated. Some official documents have also used the term rather indiscriminately, thus furthering the belief that broad targets are frequently presented to all weapons. There have been some targets of this character. For example, in the assault against 23rd Infantry Regiment positions in Chipyong-ni in early February, CCF pressed forward in fairly solid ranks, and were cut down in large numbers within small areas.
[ 转自铁血社区 http://bbs.tiexue.net/ ] But intense concentrations are the exception. The Chinese do not characteristically employ mass, for example, in the way that the Red Army used it against the Germans in operations in the Ukraine during World War II, coming on in such numbers that the human sea absorbed and ultimately smothered the fire volume. Rather, in the attack, CCF tend to move against our works in multiple, thin lines, well spaced each from the other, after having deployed out of column in the last phase of the approach.The approach column may be single file, or even a regiment moving four abreast, depending on the situation and the size of the attack force.
The nature of the ground also compounds the fire problem, since it induces greater dispersion. The ridges are not evenly bottomed or sided. There are frequent bulges, outcroppings, draws, and small ravines. In consequence, even when the attacking line advances quite uniformly, no defending weapon is likely to have a clear field of fire against any significant number of the enemy. When brought in check by the counterfire of various weapons, the enemy gradually presses forward against the position, but still does not tend to bunch excessively.
On defense, CCF make efficient employment of ground cover, eschew use of long intrenchments and tight formations, and in general so dispose themselves that our fires, in any type, rarely have a large killing opportunity. The chief effects are therefore achieved through the systematic employment of fires in combination, with no one weapon or group of weapons (such as mortars, artillery, or small arms) predominating in the delivery of decisive fire.
机枪
用法
由于朝鲜特殊的地形，使得我们在那里操作机枪的方式与常规以及教科书的规定大相径庭。
[ 转自铁血社区 http://bbs.tiexue.net/ ] 在防御的时候，机枪通常并不从两翼组成交叉火力，而是常常置于敌军的直接正面，从而对敌军最有可能的突破口进行直接的火力封锁和压制。一般情况下，那些利用山脊的高低起伏而建起的山头阵地，并不完全依赖机枪的保护。尽管有利的地形使我们的机枪在阵地上的作用变小了，但是当需要阻断一个在相当狭窄的扇形区域的敌军进攻时，通常还是机枪的作用大。有时候，机枪设置在与防线成直角的山梁和褶皱处，以这种方式他们的火力可以投射到任何径直闯进阵地的人身上。他们更频繁地布置在能以火力覆盖有利于敌人攀登的褶皱和斜坡的地方。在朝鲜很少遇到良好的机枪射界。
地形限制使这种武器失去了正常的战术效能和压制能力，而且消耗比迫击炮、勃朗宁轻机枪和步枪更大的弹药量。即使所有机枪操作状态良好，但单凭机枪火力不足以粉碎敌人的进攻，保障阵地安全。
中共军队主要以机枪火力为基础发扬战斗力，他们采用以下两种方式：（1）在防御时，将机枪配置在坚强的防御工事后方的掩体内；(2)在进攻时将机枪前出到尽可能靠近前沿的地方，尽管不可避免地要付出暴露目标的代价。
我方很少以这种方式使用机枪。
MACHINE GUNS
THEIR USE
[ 转自铁血社区 http://bbs.tiexue.net/ ] The pattern of machine-gun operation in Korea is highly unconventional and contrary to the book, but the ground permits of nothing else.
In defense, the gun is most frequently used to block the more likely avenues of approach; its fire is directed straight ahead instead of from flankward across the front.The average hilltop position, by reason of elevation and the unevenness of the ridge crust, does not lend itself to over-all protection by machine guns. They do their bit, but usually they are set to traverse over a relatively narrow sector of the perimeter.
Occasionally, as the ground and situation permit, the guns are set up on a nose or fold in the ridge running at right angles to the defending line, in such a way that their fire will take in flank any body moving directly into the position. More frequently they are disposed in such a way as to cover the main draws or the slope which looks most favorable to ascent by the enemy. Good fields of fire for the machine gun are rarely met with in Korea.
This limiting factor in the terrain deprives the weapon of its normal tactical power and persuasion, and throws an extra load of work on the mortars, the BARS, and the riflemen.Even though all guns remain in operation, machine-gun fire alone is never enough to break up enemy attack and give security to the position.
The CCF develop their fighting power largely around a base of machine-gun fire by (1) bunkering the guns behind heavily resistant works when on defense, and (2) advancing the guns well to the fore in the attack, despite the entailed exposure.
Our guns are seldom employed in this manner.
[ 转自铁血社区 http://bbs.tiexue.net/ ] 进攻中，我军士兵携带的机枪通常并不向前推进到前沿，而更经常地被布置在具有合理掩蔽条件的地点以提供半压制性的火力尽管如此，我军仍在敌军火力下损失了相当比率的机枪。在防御时，机枪经常在上方敞开的情况下作战，通常只有薄弱的防护，比如土堆或不牢固的岩石垒成的胸墙。我军要比中共军队进行更多的机动，阵地位置变换极为频繁。很少有时间为机枪提供保护措施。我军的攻势往往在黄昏时分趋弱，到天黑时机枪必须要准备好从新阵地上进行射击。进攻中，我军士兵携带的机枪通常并不向前推进到前沿，而更经常地被布置在具有合理掩蔽条件的地点以提供半压制性的火力尽管如此，我军仍在敌军火力下损失了相当比率的机枪。在防御时，机枪经常在上方敞开的情况下作战，通常只有薄弱的防护，比如土堆或不牢固的岩石垒成的胸墙。我军要比中共军队进行更多的机动，阵地位置变换极为频繁。很少有时间为机枪提供保护措施。我军的攻势往往在黄昏时分趋弱，到天黑时机枪必须要准备好从新阵地上进行射击。
Our operations develop around multiplicity of fire means - an evolution more marked in our Army than in any other. The effects of the gun are less decisive simply because of the existence of so many complementary weapons. We habitually think of machine-gun usage in connection with expansive and favorable fields of fire. In Korea these are generally lacking. There are some occasions when the gun is useful at the longer ranges for relatively brief periods. But in the crises of action, the preponderant portion of its fire almost invariably is directed against the immediate foreground. As with the rifle and the BAR, its killing effects for the most part are achieved at ranges under 300 yards.
The CCF employ the machine gun effectively at ranges running between 30 and 500 yards. In the attack, when there is suitable cover in the foreground, they will get in as close with their machine guns as with rifles and sub-machine guns, and in local counter-attacks during daylight, if they are advantaged by a thicket or brush-covered salient, they will sometimes run the machine gun out as a point beyond the rifle line.
Their reckless and effective use of the weapon at extreme short ranges, however, is less instructive than what their gunnery appears to lack over distances which we have always considered quite normal for the HMG. It is only in the exceptional tactical circumstance that CCF employ the machine gun successfully against our infantry at 500 yards range. When they attempt to engage with the gun at ranges longer than that, say adding another 200 yards to the distance, our troops are relatively unsusceptible to the fire and pay it little heed. That holds generally true even when the fire is delivered broadside against a body of infantry (or a column of vehicles) offering a fairly substantial target. According to the book, the HMG should be an accurate stopping weapon at these intermediate ranges. Insofar as the general experience of our own line during the winter campaign sheds light on this subject, it does not work out in practice. There are numerous examples in the record of engagements wherein two or three enemy guns, firing from 600-700 yards distance against one limited target area, failed to bear effectively during several hours of fighting. All of the attendant circumstances appeared to indicate that when fires are exchanged at ranges in excess of somewhere between 550 and 650 yards, the rate of effectiveness is less dependent on what the gun can do than on what the human eye can see.
他们对机枪的使用最为持久稳定。有保养机枪和在任何天气情况下操作的诀窍。他们的火力在较短距离内十分精确。最大限度的使用火力掩护部队插入而不是浪费大量子弹去扫射地面。通过这些很基本的技术，他们取得了巨大的战果。机枪作为他们的进攻的支点表现出色。
一般情况下，如果和我们携带的其他步兵武器，即7.62毫米通用口径武器族的使用效果相比，在朝鲜的战斗中，我们机枪火力所发挥的影响力似乎逊于以往的那支现代化美军中所使用的机枪火力。距离有限，使机枪不能发挥防御点和在交火中阻止敌人进攻的关键作用。怎么会这样？很难解释，因为步兵连队里的搬运工们过去从来也没有抱怨过轻机枪是个特别沉重累赘的东西。枪不是特别重，机枪手们不会掉队。曾经有过部队扛着机枪径直向敌人阵地冲锋的事例。但是一般情况下机枪却做不到根据战术形势变化而机动部署。这可能真的是出於我们多种武器系统里面天生的惰性吧：武器多了，其战术效果就是加进一种新的兵器，导致其他所有兵器的相对机动性就下降。在朝鲜的机枪使用，特别是在我们的进攻中，上述这种情况似乎出现的相当普遍，尽管普通勃朗宁轻机枪手的灵活性和显著的积极性提供了反例。
[ 转自铁血社区 http://bbs.tiexue.net/ ] Their use of machine guns is most persistent. They have the knack of keeping their guns fed and operating under any weather conditions. Their fire is accurate at the short distances. They make maximum use of grazing fire, with the object of keeping troops inert, rather than wasting an excess of bullets by shooting into the dirt embankments. Out of these rather elementary techniques, they achieve large effects. The gun is pretty much the pivot of their attack.
In general, the impact of our own machine-gun fire upon the local situation in the Korean fighting, when considered in relation to the effects of other weapons carried by the infantry (this refers to the .30 fire), would seem to be somewhat less than in past performances by modern American forces. The instances are few indeed in which the operation of the machine guns appears to be the decisive factor in retaining a position, or in depressing the counterfire which is deterring the attack. Why this is so becomes difficult to evaluate, since the LMG is almost never mentioned among the overburdening items in the company load by the load carriers. The weight of the gun is not prohibitive; the gunners do not straggle. There are instances in the record where it was carried by troops directly charging the enemy position. But the average employment of the gun is not mobile in respect to local changes in the tactical situation. This may well be the consequence of an inertia inherent in our multiple weapons system: is it not within reason that one of the tactical effects of weapons multiplication is that the addition of each new weapon tends to lower the relative local mobility of every other weapon?
The employment of machine guns in Korea, particularly by our attack, would seem to call for exploration of the question, though the phenomenal enterprise and mobility of the average BAR carrier is evidence to the contrary.
本文内容于 2008-3-27 22:56:12 被傻豪编辑
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以下是引用东风31VS三叉戟 在第5楼的发言：
亮剑精神。军魂所在。。。。。。。。。五千文明并不是一张白纸。。。。。。。。外国人无法理解。我们这个可爱的民族的
