2战日本航空兵对美国的战绩

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导读:美国战略轰炸调查 总结报告 (太平洋战争) 华盛顿市: UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY SUMMARY REPORT (Pacific War) WASHINGTON, D.C. 1 JULY 1946 日本航空部队在1942年-1945年生产了65300架飞机。有大约50000架在战争中损失,其中超过60%,也就是至少30000架是训练,运输等非战斗损失的。 只有不到40%是战斗

美国战略轰炸调查

总结报告

(太平洋战争)



华盛顿市:



UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

SUMMARY REPORT

(Pacific War)





WASHINGTON, D.C.

1 JULY 1946




日本航空部队在1942年-1945年生产了65300架飞机。有大约50000架在战争中损失,其中超过60%,也就是至少30000架是训练,运输等非战斗损失的。




只有不到40%是战斗损失,也就是有不到20000架飞机在战斗中损失。[其中至少有4000架是神风自杀飞机。实际在正常作战也就是空战,防空战,被海上和地面炮火击落的损失也就是10000多架]。



美国为了对日作战,也损失了27000架飞机,在对日作战中战斗损失8700架飞机,其他大部为运送,现地培训,防空等损失。




不计算本土损失[应为也没有计算美军的本土损失],只计算现地损失,日军损失近20000架飞机,美军损失27000架飞机。这还没计算中国,澳大利亚,英国和毛子的飞机损失呢!



所以我说:



在太平洋战场,美军飞机的损失还要大于日军飞机的损失。



就算把日本本土训练和运输损失的的3万架飞机的50%算做是运输损失,也算进战损。日军也只损失了3万5千架飞机,而盟军至少是损失了3万架。



太平洋航空战日美双方的损失,不是1个马里亚纳可以代表和屏蔽的。绝大部分人都片面的认为太平洋航空战就是一边倒的战斗。恨不得是美军损失1架,日军就要损失10架。



但是,事实却不是这样的,日本航空兵的表现非常的优异。德军在东线打的那几万架毛子飞机的战绩是无法和日军在残酷的太平洋导致美军损失2.7万架飞机相提并论的。



事实就是,德军有几个对美军的王牌???



德军也就是打美军无护航的轰炸机有两把刷子。等到区区几个大队的P51野马开始出现在欧洲的天空的时候,只区区3个月,纳粹德国空军就永远的消失在苍穹中了。日本航空兵在缅甸可是暴打过P51野马地。



而日军在太平洋是一直和美军无数的P51,F6F等精锐战斗,特别是和美军最强,最精锐的海军航空兵战斗。而且击落的绝大部分都是战斗机。战绩相当的硬实。





tactical and antishipping operations of the Fourteenth Air Force in China. The necessary training and combat experience with B-29s provided by this operation might have been secured through attacks on "Outer Zone" targets, from bases more easily supplied. In November 1944, long-range bomber attacks from Guam, Saipan and Tinian were initiated. The B-29s based in China were transferred to these bases in April 1945.


By March 1945, prior to heavy direct air attack on the Japanese home islands, the Japanese air forces had been reduced to Kamikaze forces, her fleet had been sunk or immobilized, her merchant marine decimated, large portions of her ground forces isolated, and the strangulation of her economy well begun. What happened to each of these segments of Japan's vanishing war potential is analyzed in the following sections.


ELIMINATION OF JAPANESE CONVENTIONAL AIR POWER

Japanese production of aircraft of all types rose from an average of 642 planes per month during the first 9 months of the war to a peak of 2,572 planes per month in September 1944. The rise was particularly great during 1943, after the Japanese had learned the lessons of the 1942 campaigns. Aggregate production during the war was 65,300 planes.


Japanese army and navy plane losses from all causes, both combat and noncombat, rose from an average rate of some 500 planes per month in the early months of the war to over 2,000 per month in the latter months of 1944. Aggregate losses during the course of the war were of the order of magnitude of 50,000 planes, of which something less than 40 percent were combat losses, and something over 60 percent were training, ferrying, and other noncombat losses.


The Japanese were thus able to increase the numerical strength of their air forces in planes, in almost every month of the war. Numerical strength increased from 2,625 tactical planes at the outbreak of the war to 5,000 tactical planes, plus 5,400 Kamikaze planes, at the time of surrender.


Aggregate flying personnel increased from approximately 12,000 at the outbreak of the war to over 35,000 at the time of surrender.


United States aircraft production and pilot training exceeded the Japanese totals by wide margins, but only a portion of this strength could be deployed to the Pacific. United States first line strength in the Pacific west of Pearl Harbor increased from some 200 planes in 1941 to 11,000 planes in August 1945. It was not until late 1943 that we attained numerical superiority over the Japanese air forces in the field. Even in 1942, however, the relatively few United States air units in the Pacific were able to inflict greater losses than they sustained on the numerically superior Japanese. Aggregate United States plane losses during the course of the Pacific war, not including training losses in the United States, were approximately 27,000 planes. Of these losses 8,700 were on combat missions; the remainder were training, ferrying and other noncombat losses. Of the combat losses over 60 percent were to antiaircraft fire.


As previously stated, Japanese pilots at the outbreak of the war were well trained. The average Army pilot had some 500 hours before entering combat and Navy pilots 650 hours. These experienced pilots were largely expended during the bitter campaigns of the opening year and a half of the war. The Japanese paid far less attention than we did to the protection, husbanding and replacement of their trained pilots, and were seriously hampered in their training program by a growing shortage of aviation gasoline. Average flying experience fell off throughout the war, and was just over 100 hours, as contrasted to 600 hours for United States pilots, at the time of surrender. Inadequately trained pilots were no match for the skilled pilots developed by the United States.


At the time of the initial Japanese attack, Japanese fighter planes, although less sturdily built, more vulnerable and weaker in fire power than the United States fighters, had certain flight characteristics superior to those of United States fighters then available in the Pacific. The Japanese improved the quality of their planes during the war, greatly increased the power of their aircraft engines, ultimately exceeded United States fighters in fire power and had first-class aircraft in the design and experimental stage at the end of the war. They lacked, however, the widespread technical and industrial skill to match the United States in quantity production of reliable planes with increased range, performance and durability. After the initial campaigns, the United States always enjoyed superiority in the over-all performance of its planes. By American standards,


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