from wikipedia



Date Mid-1987

Location Sumdorong Chu Valley, Arunachal Pradesh

Casus

belli Indian: People's Liberation Army invade into Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh

Result Indian troops expel PLA from Arunachal Pradesh



Events leading up the near war


After her return to power in 1980 as Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi ordered a general review of India's security plans and posture. In 1982-83, she approved a plan submitted by the Chief of the Army Staff, General K.V. Krishna Rao, to upgrade dramatically the sporadic deployment of forces along the Line of Actual Control with China.


Since the late 1960s, India had developed an elaborate plan to defend the Himalayan frontier with China. This involved the provision of screening defences at the Line of Actual Control and the building of strong defence nodes at key points along the frontier. Yet, by the early 1980s, while the forces to man the defences were ready, the nodes were not, and the big weakness was in the fact that the servicing road network had not been built. The decision was now taken to speed up the defence infrastructure construction.


There was another important change. Since 1962, India had not returned to the site of its major defeat-- the Namka Chu an east-west running stream which separates the Thag La and the Hathung La ridge to its south. India's efforts to occupy Thag La was the trigger for the October 1962 Chinese military attack on India. Because there were no other feasible defensive locations north of Tawang, the government had more or less decided that in the event of a new war, they would abandon the town and give battle at the Se La pass to its east. However, after the 1980 review, it was decided that it was important to defend Tawang in a future conflict. [1] The army made it clear that the only viable line of defence for Tawang would be along the Hathung La ridge. In 1983, an Intelligence Bureau team went to the pasturage of Sumdorong Chu which is somewhat north-east of the confluence of the Namka Chu and Nyamjiang Chu. They stayed through the summer and returned in winter. They did this in the following two years as well. But when they went in 1986, they found that the Chinese had preceded them and set up semi-permanent structures there.


In Feb 1986 the army got a new and dynamic chief, General K. Sundarji, who was determined to press the decisions taken by General Krishna Rao. In addition, Sundarji sought and got government permission to conduct an exercise named "Chequerboard" to see how quickly troops based in the Assam plains could take up their positions on the Sino-Indian border. As part of the exercise, towards the end of the year, the army landed a brigade of troops at Zimithaung, south of Hathung La using its new heavy lift Mi-26 helicopters. These forces went up and occupied the Hathung La, across the Namka Chu from Thag La. All this alarmed the Chinese enormously; they responded with alacrity and moved up their forces to take up positions all along the LAC. At points near this area-- Sulu La, Bum La, etc. the troops were now face to face with their Indian counterparts. This triggered off concerns of Sino-Indian clashes. However, there were no actual skirmishes or clashes.



Possibility of war


At the end of 1986, coincidentally perhaps or otherwise, India granted statehood to Arunachal Pradesh, which is claimed in its entirety by China. The Chinese protested. But the military movements in Tawang, taken in conjunction with this political action was seen as a provocation by the Chinese. In early 1987 Beijing's tone became ominously similar to that of 1962, and with the Indian Army refusing to stand down, Western diplomats predicted war. The result paradoxically was a thaw. Indian Foreign Minister N.D. Tiwari stopped over in Beijing in May 1987 en route to Pyongyang. He carried with him messages from Indian leaders that there was no intention on New Delhi's part to aggravate the situation. The first formal flag meeting to discuss “ the freezing of the situation” since 1962, was held on 05 August 1987 at Bum La in the aftermath of the Wangdung affair.Both sides decided to take up talks with renewed urgency and the following year, Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing, returning Zhou Enlai's '60s visit. [2]


The Indian response to the Chinese buildup was Operation Falcon and involved movements across the Sino-Indian border. Among the more interesting deployments, using Mi-26 heavy lift helicopters, was that of Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs)and some armour in North Sikkim in the east and Demchok in the west. These two were viewed as particularly threatening by the PLA because they seemed to indicate that India had moved from a strategy of defence in its own territory to that of a larger offensive involving all of southern Tibet.



Aftermath


Both India and China realised the danger of inadvertent conflict and after initial posturing the decided to de-escalate their deployments. The Sumdorong Chu fallout was that India and China decided to restart their dialogue on a new and more urgent basis. After Rajiv Gandhi's September 1988 visit, there was a hiatus of sorts because of political turmoil in India. But finally in 1993, the two countries signed an agreement to ensure peace along the LAC.


The agreement brought in an interesting concept of "mutual and equal" security where thinning of forces was envisaged, based on geographical and logistical considerations. However, its most important element, yet to be implemented, is to have the two sides work out a mutually acceptable Line of Actual Control. As of now the two sides have their own versions of the Line and there are points, especially in the Sikkim-Bhutan-India trijunction, the Sumdorong Chu area and so on where the claim overlap.



地点:阿鲁纳恰尔邦


印方开战理由:解放军入侵阿鲁纳恰尔邦


结果:印度军队将解放军从阿鲁纳恰尔邦驱逐


当她在1980年作为印度总理重掌权力之后,英迪拉*甘地命令一名将军审视印度的安全计划与态势。在1982-1983,她批准了一项由


陆军参谋长 K.V. Krishna Rao将军提交的大力提升与中国间实际控制线上零散部署的军队的方案。


自从1960年代起,精心制定了防卫喜马拉雅前线的计划。其中包括在实际控制线上掩护防御的预备以及在前线关键点上防卫节点(


支撑点?)的修筑。然而,在1980年代早期,虽然防御所用的部队已经就绪,但是节点却尚未备妥,同时还存在着便道体系尚未建


造的的巨大弱点。于是决定加速基础防卫设施的修筑。


还有另一个重要的转变。自从1962年,印度还没有回到过它的大败之地——南卡楚这个东西走向将塔


格拉与南方的哈东山口分开的溪流。印度占领塔格拉的努力由1962年10月中国军队对印度的攻击引发。因为在达旺以北没有其他的


可以用来防守的地段,政府只得决定在新的战争中放弃城镇而在东边的Se La关口作战。然而,在1980年的审查中,在未来冲突里对


达旺的防守被认为很重要。军队弄清了防守达旺仅有的补给线要沿着哈东山口。在1983年,一个情报局的小组来到了位于南卡楚与


Nyamjiang Chu交汇处东北方向的桑多洛河谷的牧区。他们在那里度过了夏天并在冬天返回,在之后的两年中也同样如此。但当他们


在1986年再过去时,他们发现中国人已经在他们之前建立了一个半永久性的建筑。


在1986年2月,活跃的新任参谋长K. Sundarji将军决意推行Krishna Rao将军的决定。此外,Sundarji还获得了政府的许可进行一项


名为“棋盘”的行动来检视在阿萨姆平原上的部队需要多久能够部署到中印边境。作为行动的一部分,在这年年底,陆军用新的米


26直升机向哈东山口以南的Zimithaung投送了一旅人马。这支部队进占了横亘在南卡楚与塔格拉之间的哈东山口。这一切都强烈的


警告了中国人,他们迅速地做出了反应,将部队调动并占据了沿着实际控制线的位置。在附近的一些地点,Sulu La, Bum La中国军


队现在与他们的印度同行面对面的碰上了。这就引起了对中印冲突的关心。但是还没有真正的发生实际的遭遇战或冲突。(?)


在1986年末,或许出于一种巧合,印度阿鲁纳恰尔授予以邦的地位,而中国宣称对其完全拥有主权。于是中国进行了抗议。在达旺


的军事行动与政治行动一道看作是对中国的挑衅。在1987年初,北京的声调开始变得如同1962年一般不怀好意,而随着印度军队拒


绝撤退,西方外交家开始对战争进行预言。印度外交部长N.D. Tiwari在前往平壤途中在北京逗留。他带来了新德里的印度领导人无


意实情况恶化的信息。自从1962年第一次正式的讨论"关系解冻"的会面于1987年8月5日在旺东事件的余波下Bum La举行。

双方决定就新的紧张状况进行会谈,下一年,拉吉夫*甘地访问北京回应周恩来在60年代的访问。


印度对中国军事集结的回应是"猎鹰行动"以及跨越中印边境的调动。在更为有意思的部署中,是步兵战车以及装甲部队在东部的锡金


北部以及西部的德穆楚克对使用米26载重直升机的使用。这两者被视作对解放军特别有威胁,因为他们似乎显示了印度已经从本土


的防御战略转为对整个藏南的更大的攻势战略。


印度和中国都意识到了无意识中发生的冲突的危险性,并在并逐渐减少部署。桑多洛河谷的余波是中印决定在一个新的和急迫的基


础上重启对话。在拉吉夫*甘地1988年的访问后,由于印度在政治上的混乱出现了一些松动,但是最终在1993年,两国签署了一项旨


在确保实际控制线沿线和平的的协议。


协议引入了一个有趣的概念“互惠与平等”,基于地理与后勤的考虑,其中正视了减少军力的问题。然而,其中最重要的要点在于


无论其被贯彻与否,双方将致力获得一条都可以接受的实际控制线。迄今为止双方都有其自己版本的的边界线,特别是在锡金-不丹


-印度交汇处、桑多洛河谷地区以及其他地点还有不少双方都做出主权声明的地方。


本文内容于 2007-10-5 6:49:32 被bw0223编辑